Volume 12 - Issue 62
/ February 2023
353
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.62.02.36
How to Cite:
Horska, K., Dosenko, A., Iuksel, G., Yuldasheva, L., & Solomatova, V. (2023). Internet platforms as alternative sources of
information during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Amazonia Investiga, 12(62), 353-360. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.62.02.36
Internet platforms as alternative sources of information during the
Russian-Ukrainian war
Las plataformas de Internet como fuentes alternativas de información durante la guerra
Rusia-Ucrania
Received: February 5, 2023 Accepted: March 28, 2023
Written by:
Kateryna Horska1
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3430-6206
Scopus Author ID: 57449483000; Researcher ID: AAD-8913-2021
Anzhelika Dosenko2
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5415-1299
Scopus Author ID: 57211338507; Researcher ID: Z-1396-2019
Gaiana Iuksel3
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0894-7544
ScopusAuthorID: 57216205308; Researcher ID: AAB-2490-2021
Lyudmyla Yuldasheva4
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6561-8827
Researcher ID: Y-6026-2019
Victorya Solomatova5
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0597-6347
Scopus Author ID: 57221338041
Abstract
The deployment of Russian military aggression
in Ukraine actualized the search for additional
sources of information about hostilities. The war
has shown that the official pro-Kremlin media is
spreading outright propaganda. So, the demand
for independent and operational information
about the situation at the front has led to the
emergence of individual observers who use
available platforms for their activities. The
purpose of the article is to analyze Internet
platforms as alternative sources of information
about the Russian-Ukrainian war. The research
used methods of analysis and synthesis,
prognostic method, content analysis. The results
trace the peculiarities of the use of digital
platforms as sources of information about
Russian aggression. The main attention is paid to
the peculiarities of work in social networks
Facebook and Twitter (we are talking about the
channels Hromadske.ua, InformNapalm),
1
Dr. Habil. (Social communication) Educational and Scientific Institute of Journalism, Taras Shevchenko National University of
Kyiv, Ukraine.
2
Ph.D. in Social Communications,Associate Professor of International Journalism, Kyiv University by Borys Hrinchenko, Ukraine.
3
Ph.D. (Philology), AssociateProfessor (Docent), AssociateProfessor (Docent) oftheV.I. VernadskyTauridaNationalUniversity,
Educational & Scientific Institute of Philology and Journalism, Department of Slavic Philology and Journalism, Kyiv, Ukraine.
4
Ph.D. in PhilologyDepartment of Slavic philology and journalism, Tavrida National V.I. Vernadsky University, Ukraine.
5
Ph.D. in History Department of Event Management, Kyiv National University of Culture and Arts, Kyiv, Ukraine.
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messengers (Telegram pages of the Center for
countering disinformation at the NSDC,
InformNapalm, DeepState). Attention is also
drawn to independent OSINT researchers, whose
reports made it possible to detect war crimes
committed by the Russian army during the
occupation of certain areas of Ukrainian
territory. The conclusions emphasize the
importance of further research into this vector, as
independent groups of analysts actively use
Internet platforms for work.
Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian war, Internet
platforms, OSINT analytics, mass media.
Introduction
The unfolding of Russian aggression in Ukraine,
which began in 2014 with the occupation of
Crimea and the organization of separatist quasi-
state formations (Sydorova et al., 2022), broke
out with a new force in February 2022. In fact, it
is possible to follow the conduct of hostilities in
real-time, as the breadth of the frontline and the
saturation of information transmission facilities
ensured that footage from both the Ukrainian and
Russian sides was quickly aired. This level of
saturation changes the perception of war
journalism and journalism in general, which are
beginning to “compete” with the latest Internet
platforms, where all interested parties post
content of interest that quickly spreads across the
Web. The use of such a tool can become an
instrument of propaganda because there is a
desire to present one's achievements in a more
favorable light in a hard-fought environment
(Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2018). At the same time,
the very principle of presenting military actions
is quite revolutionary. Moreover, it is not only
the political or informational aspect that is being
talked about. Thanks to digital technology, there
is also surveillance and recording of the
commission of war crimes - for example, Russian
shelling of Ukrainian settlements with incendiary
shells. Some military specialists, thanks to
available videos, make detailed analyses of the
tactics of troop movements and their actions in
combat.
The use of Internet platforms also has negative
manifestations. The use of Internet platforms also
has negative aspects, most notably the use of
provocative or deceptive materials, covert
propaganda, sowing discord and intolerance, etc.
(Singh, 2021). (Singh, 2021). In the context of
war, these measures will definitely increase in
frequency and frequency of use.
The purpose of this article is to analyze Internet
platforms as alternative sources of information
about the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Theoretical Framework or Literature Review
The literary basis of the study consists of the
works of European and American scholars who
have studied the peculiarities of the functioning
of Internet journalism. In particular, the
American researchers Brooks & Porter (2020)
formed a model of media influence on the
ideology of content in social networks. They note
that many people now rely on social media as
their main sources of information, while at the
same time, how the dissemination of media
information with ideologies in the whole political
space is important for the formation of online
discussions outside the networks. Norwegian
researchers Karlsen & Aalberg (2021), in their
pilot study, determined the impact of Internet
media on the formation of consumer trust in
content. American researchers Warwick et al.,
(2021) described the problem of the successful
use of social media. In addition, Golbeck (2015)
investigated the peculiarities of the development
of modern Internet journalism, characterized the
main features of Twitter.
At the same time, Pavlik (2022), a well-known
American researcher of the influence of modern
technology on the media, described the key
features of the coverage of the Russian-
Ukrainian war in the Western media. Hurska
(2021) described the main manifestations of
Horska, K., Dosenko, A., Iuksel, G., Yuldasheva, L., Solomatova, V. / Volume 12 - Issue 62: 353-360 / February, 2023
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hybrid warfare using the events in Ukraine as an
example. Key aspects of the information
confrontation between Ukraine and Russia are
reflected in the work of Romanian scholars
Bînă&Dragomir (2020). The Bulgarian
researcher Michailova (2022) explored similar
issues. Ukrainian researcher Bukina (2022)
described the importance of media literacy
during Ukraine's hybrid war. On the other hand,
Veselkov (2022) investigated the specifics of
information warfare since the full-scale invasion
of Ukraine by the Russians. Zhabotynska &
Ryzhova (2022) analyzed pro-Russian Chinese
media and identified the main disinformation
facts disseminated by these media. The
methodological basis of the article is also based
on the findings of researchers who have studied
the peculiarities of information security in the
conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In
particular, Prokopenko (2022) studied the key
aspects of information policy formation in the
conditions of global challenges of modernity.
Hbur (2022) identified the theoretical
foundations of information security of Ukraine as
a significant part of the national security of the
country as a whole.
Methodology
The study is formed based on analysis and
synthesis, by which initially the main subject of
research (Internet platforms) is divided into
smaller parts (problems): features of the use of
Internet journalism in the conditions of military
operations, coverage of war events on Twitter,
the value of Telegram channels for informing the
population is investigated Later these parts are
combined and their own judgments are formed.
Based on the predictive method the problem of
further use of Internet platforms as sources of
coverage of the events of the Russian-Ukrainian
war was reflected.
The study analyzed the individual Internet sites
talking about the war and their acanthus in social
networks, in particular, Facebook and Twitter:
Hromadske.ua, InformNapalm, Ukraine Crisis
Media Center, etc. At the same time, much
attention is paid to the role of modern Telegram
channels in informing, for this purpose such
channels as the Center for Counteracting
Disinformation under the National Security and
Defense Council, Spravdi, InformNapalm,
DeepState, etc. are studied. Particular attention is
paid to the personal channels and pages of
famous politicians.
The descriptive method, which was implemented
to implement the theoretical basis of the
scientific work and the main theoretical
postulates of the functioning of platforming and
content; content analysis of the content of the
platforms in the period of four months from July
to October 2022. The method of surveying 1000
respondents to find out the estimated number of
platforms subscribed to by different categories of
respondents.
During the survey, respondents were asked to
indicate the range of Internet resources and
digital channels of information transmission that
they used to obtain truthful information about
events in Ukraine, in particular, about the
unfolding of Russian military aggression. To
complete, the survey was divided into age
groups, which made it possible to determine the
dynamics of the influence of digital journalism
on the audience, according to preferences. Based
on this, it was possible to generalize about the
greater impact of the transmission of digital
information on social processes in the future.
Such a result could also be obtained thanks to the
combination of interviews with the forecast
method
.
Results and Discussion
Digital Platforms as Sources of Information
on Russian Aggression: Features of Use
Of particular importance in covering the events
of the Russo-Ukrainian war is Twitter, a social
network where users can create messages
(tweets) with a maximum length of 280
characters and share them with their followers
(Golbeck, 2015). In particular, the independent
media resource Hromadske.ua is dedicated to
news and events in Ukraine. It actively monitors
the events of the war in Ukraine and shares
information about the consequences of local
residents. InformNapalm media platform
specializes in tracking Russian aggression in
Ukraine and other countries. Their Twitter
account distributes all sorts of news about the
war in Ukraine and provides comprehensive
analysis of Russian propaganda in social
networks. A non-profit resource called Ukraine
Crisis Media Center was created to implement
information analytics regarding various events in
Ukraine. The account generates special reports
on the war and shares analyses of the situation in
certain areas. In general, this resource covers
various topical reports related to the war in
Ukraine, which cover economic, political,
humanitarian and cultural issues. According to a
study of Ukraine Crisis Media Center content on
their Twitter account, several themes can be
identified. First, reporting on the war and
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violations of major international conventions by
the Russians is important. The platform regularly
reports on the situation on the front, including a
number of crimes committed by the Russians,
analyzes the statistics of attacks on Ukrainian
Bpositions, etc. (Center for countering
disinformation at the NSDC, 2023, February 20).
Second, a separate focus of the account is
humanitarian aid and the protection of human
rights: the platform provides up-to-date
information about humanitarian aid to residents
in frontline areas, as well as information about
the protection of human rights in the realities of
war (Center for countering disinformation at the
NSDC, 2023, February 25). On the other hand,
the platform characterizes Russian propaganda,
analyzes Russian fakes, disinformative
messages, and demonstrates how the Russian
media falsify the real facts about the events in
Ukraine. Also, this resource publishes actual
political statements of presidents, governments,
politicians of different countries about the events
in Ukraine and its support. Their official page has
a separate section called Russia attacks Ukraine:
live update, where news related to the Russian-
Ukrainian war is constantly updated (Ukraine
Crisis, 2022), the section links to current updates
on Twitter.
Recently, Telegram has become especially
popular and is displacing Facebook as a source of
communication and information delivery
(Bukina, 2022). The key reason for this is that
Facebook has not changed at all in recent years
(Karpitskaya & Chuyanava, 2021), and the
generation that grew up on it, therefore, it does
not meet the basic needs and requirements of
today's younger generation (Pavlik, 2022).
Therefore, Telegram positions itself as a
mainstream messenger whose key goal is to
provide a safe environment for communication.
The main distinguishing feature of this platform
is channels that are completely different from
those on Twitter or Facebook (Warwick et al.,
2021). This platform works in a very different
way, it satisfies the demands of society directly
through the delivery of short theses messages at
maximum speed. Consequently, the key features
of Telegram are promptness, speed, and
accessibility. Ukrainian Telegram functions
through so-called nets: channels that display
current social and political topics and often
distribute materials from one channel to another
(Pavlik, 2022). What distinguishes them is their
openness and anonymity, i.e., they can be hosted
on behalf of a well-known political, cultural, or
other figure. In addition, they are formed based
on anonymity, that is, no one will know their
origin and it is not always easy to establish their
key purpose. These factors often influence the
formation of the illusion of freedom in Telegram
(Brooks & Porter, 2020).
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale
invasion, the messaging platform has become a
digital war news distribution network (Hbur,
2022). Contemporary researchers note that it is a
tool for governments and citizens on both sides
to share information (Prokopenko, 2022). Many
Ukrainian politicians, parties, and officials,
including President V. Zelensky, run their own
channels. The Russian government does the
same. Consequently, the Telegram network has
become the main social Internet platform
offering an unfiltered view of the events of the
Russian-Ukrainian war. It is known that the
Ukrainian government quickly repurposed the
official channel COVID-19, which had been used
in recent years to share news about the spread of
the crown virus and to provide official effective
information on the fight against it. This project
was renamed UkraineNow and now has more
than four million readers on Ukrainian and
English channels. Minister of Digital
Transformation N. Fedorov's team used this
program to recruit the so-called “T Army,” now
consisting of 300,000 cybersecurity volunteers.
President V. Zelensky actively uses Telegram to
report important news and share personal videos
with the world. As of February 2023, his channel
had more than 9 million people. At the same
time, Ukrainian authorities have found several
other practical uses for the platform. Most
different cities and towns or local authorities
organize their own Telegram channels. In this
way, authorities disseminate various air raid
warnings, shelter map data, security information,
etc. Consequently, since the beginning of the
full-scale Russian invasion, this platform has
become not only a means of receiving
information but also acts as a kind of way to
inform the civilian population. There are also
special telegram bots through which Ukrainian
citizens can report on the movement of Russian
troops or equipment (Pace University (n.d.)). The
most common Telegram channels in Ukraine are:
Center for Countering Disinformation under the
CNBO, Spravdi, Inform Napalm, Deep State,
Public, etc. A special feature of the DeepState
platform is the map of military operations, which
reflects in detail all the territorial changes in the
war. In addition, the resource maintains detailed
daily analytics and a review of events on the
front. The Center for Countering Disinformation
debunks major propaganda fakes and
disinformation messages. In particular, the
official website of the Center contains important
messages, such as “What is the purpose of the
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main Kremlin IPSOs in the war against Ukraine,”
“Behind Putin's Address to the Federal
Assembly,” “How the Kremlin Altered Entire
Wars Against Ukraine,” etc. The International
Intelligence Community's InformNapalm
channel has over 150,000 subscribers and is a
volunteer initiative to disseminate current news
and reporting on the Russian-Ukrainian war.
DeepState contains important analysis about
events on the front in Ukraine. AFU-operational
channel, with 450 thousand subscribers, actively
disseminates reports on current news regarding
the situation on the front and the successes of the
AFU.
Also, the interview was provided. Respondents
had the question: "How many platforms and
publics are you subscribed to in order to be
constantly informed about events in Ukraine?".
All respondents were divided into age categories.
The first category was Youth (18 to 35). The
second category was Middle (35–50 years old).
The third group was Old(from 50 to 61 years
old). Schematically, it can be represented as
follows.
Fig. 1. The amount of platforms subscribed to by respondents of different age categories
In results we obtained the following statistic: the
first age category receives information
systematically from at least 5 to 8 platforms or
publics. The second category is from 5-11, but
75% of the respondents of this age category
indicate that they have at least 3 publics that they
prioritize and trust the most among all
subscribers. The third age category subscribes to
3 to 6 telegram channels and media platforms
that they trust the most and do not take into
account others, because they are authoritative for
them. Also, the specified age category informs
that they receive news from traditional mass
media, which are more authoritative for them
than other sources.
As a result, we obtained the following statistics:
representatives of the first age group
systematically received information from at least
5-8 platforms or online publics. Representatives
of the second category indicated that they have at
least 3 publics that they consider to be quite
authoritative. People in the third age group
subscribe to 3-6 telegram channels or other
online platforms that they trust. At the same time,
these people also consider traditional media
reports to be authoritative, which are sometimes
trusted much more. Thus, representatives of the
younger generation have more trust in online
resources and digital media than older people.
This indicates that trust in online journalism and
digital information channels will continue to
grow.
OSINT research on the Russian-Ukrainian
war
OSINT platforms became popular during the
Russian-Ukrainian war, publishing private
investigative information and having high
efficiency (Kordan, 2022).Open-source
intelligence (OSINT) is a theoretical
methodology, concept, and definition of tools for
searching and retrieving military, political, and
economic information in principle using open
sources that are not in violation of law (Hurska,
2021). These analytics are acceptable for use in
national defense and security decision-making,
operational investigative procedures, etc.
(Veselkov, 2022). Typically, OSINT consists of
the following elements: finding information
resources, registering them, recording and
analytic-synthetic parsing of “raw” information,
storing the resulting data, disseminating it, and
setting up security. Primary data, even from open
sources, with the proper level of processing, can
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contain a lot of valuable information, which after
synthetic parsing can already be secret (if there is
a need to have the status of state secrets)
(D'Anieri, 2019). In addition to photographs and
television footage, the field of analysts includes
media publications, scientific publications and
conference presentations, open government data,
commercial literature, patent information, radio
monitoring, and aerial surveys from open sources
(e.g., Google Maps).
Such research, due to the development of digital
technology, is being done not only by
professional analysts and intelligence agencies
but also by ordinary users who like to investigate
(Pawełoszek et al., 2022). Since information is
publicly available on the Internet, it is not
forbidden by law (Karlsen & Aalberg, 2021). In
the realities of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
such analysts have had several notable successes
that have become global sensations,
unfortunately with a negative flavor.
On July 17, 2014,the Malaysian Boeing 777 was
shot down in the sky over the Donetsk region.
Bellingcat group of private researchers, based on
the analysis of the available material on the web,
determined that the perpetrators of the tragedy
were pro-Russian separatists, who used Buk
SAM of one of the Russian brigades (apparently,
under the command of the Russian military) to
carry out the attack. The Russian side concealed
this crime for a long time, but the case before the
Dutch court established the direct involvement of
Russian citizens in this act (Inform Napalm,
2023). During the Russian-Ukrainian war, the
Russian Ministry of Defense and the official
Kremlin attempt to recognize the released
photographs and video evidence of Russian
brutality and crime as provocations and staging
for the European and American media (Bînă &
Dragomir, 2020).
The official Kremlin media have long denied the
crimes of Russian troops in Bucha, noting that
local residents were not harmed and that exits
from the city were not blocked. Such assessments
were picked up on pro-Russian Internet
platforms, and there were even attempts to
disprove the Wikipedia article in question as
false. At the same time, OSINT specialists from
the U.S. company Maxar Technologies were the
first to try to refute the fakes of Kremlin
propaganda. Having analyzed satellite photos,
they presented pictures of tortured bodies left in
Bucha after the Russian military left there.
Thanks to this, it is established that civilians
began to be killed from March 9-11. They were
in the same places where they were found by the
Ukrainian military who liberated Bucha on
March 31. Based on OSINT analysis, it was
possible to establish that the killed civilians had
been in this position for three weeks - the said
crime was definitely committed by the Russian
military. The information of private OSINT-
researchers, when verified, turned out to be true
and was published by several well-known
American publications on their websites.
A weighty Internet platform for independent
experiments was the Dutch project Oryx. It is
based on OSINT analytics, a confirmation of
combat losses in equipment based on open
sources. Initially, this site was focused on the
Syrian war. However, since February 2022, the
focus has been on Russian aggression. Thanks to
the detailed work of this project, the catastrophic
losses of the Russian army in Ukraine are now
proven. It is primarily about military equipment,
as Oryx specialists work with visual sources,
collecting information about destroyed, captured,
and disabled combat vehicles, tanks, artillery,
etc. At the same time, OSINT researchers are
functioning, researching personnel losses. For
example, the account NecroMancer (which
operates on the platform of the social network
Twitter) from 2014 calculates losses of pro-
Russian separatists and the Russian army in
eastern Ukraine. For this purpose, it uses
information from open sources - primarily social
networks. He supports his calculations and
messages not only with messages taken out of
context, but also with photos from funeral sites,
official reports of the Russian authorities, etc.
So, OSINT analytics looks like an extremely
promising independent branch of journalism that
posts relevant information on relevant Internet
platforms (Bila & Hrytsenko, 2022). Although
these studies can spread fakes and propaganda,
individual groups of researchers value their
renown and report only verified information.
Conclusions
Internet platforms have become influential
alternative sources of information about the
course of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The
digitalization of society has resulted in
information that can be obtained and transmitted
instantly. Because of this, the Internet has
become an influential field for the emergence of
independent research that is not devoid of
subjectivity (personal or planned). In particular,
the Russian-Ukrainian war is actively
represented in social networks that span the
entire modern world. For example, there are
independent Hromadske.ua, InformNapalm, and
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other media researchers on Twitter who
specialize in reviewing the consequences and
course of Russian aggression in Ukraine. There
are also descriptions of military actions and
separate information on them on Facebook and
other powerful platforms. The resources of
messengers are also actively used to disseminate
independent information. In Ukraine, Telegram
is particularly popular, with individual groups
disseminating information about the course of
hostilities and other messages. Such groups also
have a political bias (pro-Russian, pro-
Ukrainian).
The work of OSINT researchers has become an
important area of activity, which the Russian-
Ukrainian war has brought to the fore.
Independent groups of experts and analysts
working with open-access information have
dispelled several myths of Russian propaganda
and attested to the war crimes committed by the
Russian army since 2014. For example,
Belingcat group was one of the first to provide
weighty photo and video evidence of Russian
military involvement in Boeing 777 damage in
July 2014. Also, other groups of private analysts
proved by open source materials the involvement
of the Russian military in the mass murder of
civilians in Bucha, Kyiv region. Although the
OSINT research community is also biased,
serious international groups value their own
reputations and do not allow doubts about the
truthfulness of their own investigations. Further
research in this area is quite promising since
through the use of Internet platforms private
groups of analysts are able to act as a valid
alternative to the official media.
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